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Robots intended for social contexts are often designed with explicit humanlike
attributes in order to facilitate their reception by (and communication with) people.
However, observation of an “uncanny valley”—a phenomenon in which highly humanlike
entities provoke aversion in human observers—has lead some to caution against this
practice. Both of these contrasting perspectives on the anthropomorphic design of
social robots find some support in empirical investigations to date. Yet, owing to
outstanding empirical limitations and theoretical disputes, the uncanny valley and its
implications for human-robot interaction remains poorly understood. We thus explored
the relationship between human similarity and people’s aversion toward humanlike
robots via manipulation of the agents’ appearances. To that end, we employed a
picture-viewing task (Nagents = 60) to conduct an experimental test (Nparticipants = 72)
of the uncanny valley’s existence and the visual features that cause certain humanlike
robots to be unnerving. Across the levels of human similarity, we further manipulated
agent appearance on two dimensions, typicality (prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous)
and agent identity (robot, person), and measured participants’ aversion using both
subjective and behavioral indices. Our findings were as follows: (1) Further substantiating
its existence, the data show a clear and consistent uncanny valley in the current design
space of humanoid robots. (2) Both category ambiguity, and more so, atypicalities
provoke aversive responding, thus shedding light on the visual factors that drive people’s
discomfort. (3) Use of the Negative Attitudes toward Robots Scale did not reveal
any significant relationships between people’s pre-existing attitudes toward humanlike
robots and their aversive responding—suggesting positive exposure and/or additional
experience with robots is unlikely to affect the occurrence of an uncanny valley effect in
humanoid robotics. This work furthers our understanding of both the uncanny valley, as
well as the visual factors that contribute to an agent’s uncanniness.
Keywords: anthropomorphism, emotion regulation, humanoid robots, human-robot interaction, uncanny valley,
social robotics
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1. INTRODUCTION

methodologies. For example, two recent studies utilized picturebased stimuli (photographs depicting embodied robots) to
evaluate a large portion1 of the current design space in humanoid
robotics (Strait et al., 2015; Mathur and Reichling, 2016). In
combination, recent work paints a more consistent picture in
which there exists a robust uncanny valley as a function of human
similarity.
Despite perspectives on the valley’s existence trending toward
agreement, many critical questions remain. In particular, when,
why, and how do robots fall into the uncanny valley? Researchers
have long pointed to human similarity as the cause of the
valley effect—wherein a robot with “too much” similarity is
unnerving. However, several studies indicate that similarity
alone is not sufficient to cause a humanoid robot to fall
into the valley. For example, Rosenthal-von der Pütten and
Krämer (2014, 2015) have repeatedly shown that people respond
negatively toward some instances of highly humanlike robots
but positively toward others. Moreover, an experiment by Schein
and Gray (2015) showed that humans too can be perceived
as unnerving, suggesting that humanness (and a biologicallyhuman appearance) is not enough to avoid the valley.
Finding the answers to these questions has particular
relevance to human-robot interaction and the design of social
robots. Despite the superficial nature of a robot’s appearance,
its appearance nevertheless substantially impacts how people
perceive it and whether they are willing to interact with it (e.g.,
Strait et al., 2015; Mathur and Reichling, 2016). Thus, to achieve
effective robot designs (or, at least, avoid ineffective ones), it
remains crucial to gain better understanding of the uncanny
valley and the variables (both visual and behavioral) that drive it.

By capitalizing on traits that are familiar and intuitive to people,
robots designed with greater human similarity—both physically
and behaviorally—can offer more natural and effective humanrobot interactions (Duffy, 2003; Złotowski et al., 2015). For
example, incorporating humanlike cues into a robot’s design
elicits feelings of empathy toward it (Riek et al., 2009) and causes
attribution of greater agency (Gray and Wegner, 2012; Broadbent
et al., 2013; Stafford et al., 2014a). In turn, this has significant
prosocial outcomes such as increases in people’s comfort around
a robot (Sauppé and Mutlu, 2015) and their willingness to
collaborate with it (Andrist et al., 2015).
With the emergence of increasingly humanlike robots,
however, researchers have observed an unintended consequence:
the uncanny valley effect (Mori et al., 2012). The valley effect,
originally described by Masahiro Mori nearly a half-century
ago, refers to the phenomenon wherein highly humanlike (but
not prototypically human) entities provoke aversion in people
(for a review, see Kätsyri et al., 2015). For example, highly
humanlike robots are rated more negatively (MacDorman, 2006),
avoided more frequently (Strait et al., 2015), and attributed less
trustworthiness (Mathur and Reichling, 2016) than their less
humanlike counterparts and humans. Moreover, such effects do
not appear to be limited to adults, as valley-like effects have been
observed in infants (Lewkowicz and Ghazanfar, 2012; Matsuda
et al., 2012), children (Yamamoto et al., 2009), and even other
primates (Steckenfinger and Ghazanfar, 2009), suggesting the
general phenomenon is relatively pervasive.
Yet, the uncanny valley continues to be a poorly understood
and even contentious topic in human-robot interaction (HRI)
research, due to gaps in the current literature and various
empirical inconsistencies. These issues stem, at least in part,
from challenges inherent to conducting empirical HRI studies
(in particular, the limited accessibility of robotic platforms that
only partially represent the large design space). This has lead
researchers to turn to more accessible alternatives, such as the
use of computer-generated stimuli to make inferences about
embodied counterparts (e.g., Inkpen and Sedlins, 2011) and
careful case studies of only one or a few robotic platforms (e.g.,
Bartneck et al., 2009; Kupferberg et al., 2011; Saygin et al.,
2012; Strait et al., 2014). But the small range of methodologies
for investigating the valley, in turn, has lead to conflicting
findings. For example, amongst studies utilizing few robots or
non-embodied robot stimuli, there are both many studies which
fail to find a valley effect (or find the opposite – more positive
responding to the most humanlike stimuli; e.g., Bartneck et al.,
2009; Kupferberg et al., 2011; Piwek et al., 2014) as well as many
that confirm its existence (e.g., Saygin et al., 2012; Koschate et al.,
2016; Strait et al., 2015).
Considering that the theoretical comparisons are being made
across such dissimilar methodologies, it is unsurprising that
inconsistencies have arisen and that gaps in the literature
remain. Researchers have begun to address such shortcomings
through systematic review of the literature (Kätsyri et al.,
2015; Rosenthal-von der Pütten and Krämer, 2015; MacDorman
and Chattopadhyay, 2016) and development of alternative
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1.1. Present Work
Here, we aimed to further examine the uncanny valley as it
pertains to human-robot interaction. Our contributions are
three-fold: in addition to providing another experimental test
of the valley’s existence, we investigated what design factors
cause a robot to fall into the valley. In particular, we tested
two theoretically-motivated factors – atypicality and category
ambiguity – for their effects on perceptions of uncanniness and
people’s corresponding aversion. Finally, we aimed to address
an outstanding shortcoming of the current literature, namely
whether people’s aversion can be explained by pre-existing
negative attitudes toward robots.
Recent reviews of valley literature have pointed to two
explanatory mechanisms underlying the effect: atypicality and
category ambiguity (cf. Kätsyri et al., 2015; MacDorman
and Chattopadhyay, 2016). Atypicality (also called “feature
atypicality” and “realism inconsistency”) refers to the presence
of features unusual for an agent’s category. For example, Albert
Hubo is an atypical robot with its prototypically mechanical body
combined with an atypical (highly humanlike) head. Derived
from theories of perceptual mismatch, atypicality is proposed
to underlie uncanniness via violation of expectations about how
an agent should look/behave based on its category membership
1 In

contrast to the aforementioned studies (which involved 1-3 robots), both
studies referenced here involved 45–80 robots.
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(H1b–c). We further predicted, based on perceptually-oriented
theories of categorization and processing, that salient atypicalities
(M1) and/or high category ambiguity (M2) might underlie such
discomfort.

(Groom et al., 2009; Saygin et al., 2012). Perceptual mismatch
theories thus predict that any atypical agent (robot or human)
will provoke aversion.
Category ambiguity, on the other hand, refers to a difficulty
in determining the category to which an entity belongs (e.g.,
Burleigh et al., 2013; Yamada et al., 2013). For example, people
have difficulty perceiving the Geminoid HI as being a robot
because of its very humanlike design (Rosenthal-von der Pütten
et al., 2014). Derived from theories of categorical perception,
category ambiguity is proposed to underlie uncanniness via
doubt about what an entity is (Jentsch, 1997). Contrary to the
above, categorical perception theories predict that the valley
effect is greatest at category boundaries (e.g., the robot-human
boundary), with aversion decreasing outwards with increasing
distance.
In the present study, we observed people’s subjective and
behavioral aversion toward 60 distinct robots and humans
using the popular picture-viewing methodology used in emotion
research (see Vujovic et al., 2013), as adapted for HRI research
involving social signals (Strait et al., 2015; see Figure 2).
Participants were presented with the 60 photographs sequentially
and for 12 s each. For each viewing, participants had the option
to press a button if they wished to terminate the encounter
early (thereby engaging in behavioral avoidance). In total, we
collected participants’ subjective ratings of the agents’ eeriness,
the frequency at which they terminated encounters with the
various agents, and their reasons for terminating.
Per Mori’s uncanny valley theory, we hypothesized that people
would be averse to highly humanlike – but not prototypic –
agents (H1: Valley Hypothesis). Specifically, relative to people
of prototypically human appearances and robots of low human
similarity, we expected that the appearance of highly humanlike
agents would be so discomforting (as evidenced by higher ratings
of eeriness; H1a) that people would avoid their encounters more
frequently (H1b), and that they would report doing so due to
being unnerved (H1c).
In confirming the existence of a valley in the design space
included, we looked at the governing mechanisms underlying
uncanniness (when, why, and how an agent falls into the
valley) with two further predictions following from the literature.
Specifically, we hypothesized that people would be more averse to
atypical agents than prototypic agents (M1: Feature Atypicality).
We also hypothesized that people would be more averse
to ambiguous agents than prototypic agents (M2: Category
Ambiguity). In addition to the above predictions, we explored
how the two proposed mechanisms – atypicality vs. ambiguity—
interact with the agents’ actual category membership (whether
the agent in question is a robot or a person) in provoking
aversion, and further, whether people’s aversive responding can
be explained by pre-existing negative attitudes toward robots.

2.1. Design
To test our predictions, we conducted a within-subjects
experiment in which we presented participants with 60 distinct
agents which spanned two ontological categories (robot, person)
and were of appearances that varied semi-hierarchically across
two overlapping dimensions – human similarity (three levels:
low, high, and prototypic) and typicality (three levels: prototypic,
atypical, and ambiguous)2 . In total, the study involved six agent
conditions (with 10 agents per condition):
• 10 agents of low human similarity (i.e., prototypic robots such
as the mechanomorphic REEM-C);
• 40 agents of high (but not prototypically human) human
similarity:
• 10 robots with atypical features (e.g., Albert Hubo),
• 10 robots of ambiguous category membership (e.g., the
Geminoid DK),
• 10 people with atypical features (e.g., persons with bionic
prostheses), and
• 10 people of ambiguous category membership (persons
wearing black, full-sclera contacts);
• 10 agents of prototypic human similarity (i.e., people of typical
appearances).
Table 1 shows exemplars of each agent condition, as well as the
semi-hierarchical mapping between the three manipulations (the
agent’s approximate human similarity and their typicality relative
to their respective category membership).

2.1.1. Valley Hypothesis
The manipulation of the agents’ human similarity was used
to test whether or not there exists an uncanny valley within
the current design space of humanoids and range of human
appearances (H1). Note that, in testing the valley hypothesis,
we collapse across the four sets of robots and people of
atypic and ambiguous designations as their normalized ratings
of human similarity constitute high—but not prototypic—
human similarity. That is, they are rated as significantly
more humanlike than mechanomorphic humanoids and
significantly less humanlike than people of prototypic
appearances.

2.1.2. Mechanisms
Via the typicality manipulation, we further tested whether two
mechanisms (M1: feature atypicality; M2: category ambiguity)
drive the valley’s effects by drilling down within the set of
highly humanlike agents. Specifically, via the explicit inclusion
and clustering of highly humanlike agents by those with
appearances atypic for their respective category and those of

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
Based on Mori’s valley hypothesis, we expected that highly
humanlike (but not prototypic) agents may be so eerie (H1a) that
people avoid their encounters because due to being unnerved

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

2 Due to the current design space of humanoid robotics and range of human
appearances (e.g., there do no exist stimuli depicting people of “low human
similarity”), the study did not involve a factorial design.
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TABLE 1 | Exemplars of the six agent conditions, with: the agent’s category membership reflected across the dotted y-axis (top row: robot; bottom: person); the human
similarity manipulation shown along the x-axis (increasing left to right: from low similarity to high—inclusive of atypic and ambiguous typicality levels – to prototypically
human), and the corresponding typicality levels indicated via color-coding (gray: prototypic for a given ontology; orange: atypical; and blue: ambiguous). Robots (top;
from left to right): a prototypic robot (PAL ROBOTICS’ REEM-C); a robot with a salient atypicality (KAIST’s Albert Hubo); and a robot of ambiguous ontology (the Geminoid
DK; shown, for comparison, in front of Henrik Scharfe – the person after which it was modeled). People: a person of prototypically human human similarity; a person with
a prosthetic arm; and a person of “ambiguous” humanness (a person wearing black sclera contacts; face enlarged for emphasis).
low

high

prototypic

(prototypic robot)

(inclusive of both atypical and ambiguous agents)

(prototypic person)

Attribution (from top left to bottom right): shown are adaptations of photographs by JosepPAL, Dayofid, and Eirik Newth; SalganikEA and Matthew Batchelder. Original photos
(https://goo.gl/38yUr1, https://goo.gl/00o07k, https://goo.gl/T7Ym4O; https://goo.gl/YfndfO, https://goo.gl/UB62Ac) available under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0
Unported, Attribution 2.5 Generic, or Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic licenses3 .

2.2.1. Set Construction

ambiguous category membership, we contrasted the role of
each of the two mechanisms (against prototypicality) in eliciting
discomfort. Here, we additionally included the manipulation
of ontological category (robot vs. person), as both the feature
atypicality and category ambiguity hypotheses require that the
valley effect be evident regardless of the agent’s actual category
membership. Thus, in testing the two hypothesis, the three
typicality levels (prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous) are robothuman inclusive (e.g., prototypic included mechanomorphic
humanoids
and
people
of
prototypically
human
appearances).

We constructed our initial stimulus set via a systematic search
using stringent inclusion criteria based on that developed by
Mathur and Reichling (2016). The purpose of the criteria was
to reduce any researcher bias that may be present in image
selection (e.g., agent expression, pose, etc.). The criteria were as
follows:
• Visibility: the agent’s face/torso and eyes are fully visible
(shown from top of head to waist; face is shown in frontal to
3/4 aspect).
• Embodiment: the agent is capable of interacting socially with
humans (e.g., if a robot, the agent has been built and is capable
of physical movement).
• Affect: the agent is expressionless/affect-neutral.
• Familiarity: the agent is not a replica of a well-known character
or a famous person (e.g., Albert Hubo).
• Image characteristics: the resolution of the image is sufficient
to yield a final cropped image of 6x6” with a resolution of 100
DPI.

2.2. Materials
To construct a final set of high quality and relatively comparable
photos, the stimuli used in this experiment were selected from
an initial superset of 120 photos. The 120 photos were obtained
from various academic and online sources based on strict
inclusion/exclusion criteria and pretested for their fit within
the six intended agent categories to reduce within-category
variability.

We performed ten Google image searches on a single day using
the following search phrases: ”humanoid robot,” ”humanlike
robot,” “robot with humanlike face,” “android robot,” “highly

3 https://goo.gl/eTRg2B
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FIGURE 1 | Structure of Pretesting Trials/Manipulation Checks. Each trial began with a prompt to the participant to place their hands on the keyboard as shown (with
the left and right index fingers on the “r” and “h” keys respectively). When the participant was ready to continue, they pressed the spacebar to start the categorization
task. After a response was entered for the categorization, participants completed two prompts for explicit ratings of the agent’s atypicality5 and human similarity.
Pretesting only: each trial was preceded by a 1 s fixation point and followed by a 2 s rest period.

sequentially and in an order randomized by participant. For each
image, we measured the agent’s “category ambiguity” (indexed by
participants’ accuracy in a categorization task and their latency
to respond), atypicality, and human similarity (see Figure 1).
Then, to concentrate atypicality within the set of atypical agents
and category ambiguity within the set of ambiguous agents,
we reduced the pretested set of 120 photographs down to 60
(with 10 instances per agent category) by selecting for categoryambiguous agents with lowest atypicality and atypical agents with
lowest category ambiguity.

humanlike robot,” “robot that looks human”; “black sclera
contacts,” “people wearing sclera contacts,” “people with bionic
prostheses,” “person candid photograph.” In collating a set of
20 atypical humanoids, we intentionally searched for humanoid
robots with a salient mismatch in the realism of their head/torso
due to greater availability of robots with this particular design. As
the closest human analog (in appearance) to the set of atypical
humanoids (robots with features that are atypical in terms of
frequency of appearance within the humanoid design space),
we specifically searched for people with a bionic prosthetic.
To collate an analogous set of 20 people of “ambiguous”
ontology (i.e., questionable membership in the person category),
we intentionally searched for people wearing black, full-sclera
contacts as it is a visual modification often used in media to
convey different category membership (see for example: the
Supernatural TV series, 2005–) and prior literature suggests that
people perceive such stimuli as uncanny (Schein and Gray, 2015).
When a search returned multiple images of a particular
agent, we included only the first image encountered. For each
of the intended agent categories, we included the first 20
photographs satisfying inclusion criteria and depicting distinct
agents. However, we note that our resulting set of ambiguous
robots was comprised of robots that were predominately female
(15 of 20) and Asian (13 of 20) in appearance.4 For comparability
between conditions, we thus adjusted the composition of our
human stimuli to reflect similar demographics. Specifically, we
manually searched for replacements (per the above criteria)
for the initially-selected images to adjust the gender and racial
composition of the three sets of human stimuli.

2.2.3. Manipulation Checks
To confirm that this final set of 60 images reflected our design
assumptions (that agents labeled as atypical were perceived as
most atypical, agents labeled as ambiguous were most ambiguous,
etc.), analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted on the
dependent variables indexing ambiguity (categorization error
rate, response time) and atypicality with typicality as the
independent variable. Each ANOVA revealing significant effects
was followed by t-tests examining the planned, pairwise contrasts
(atypical, ambiguous vs. prototypic)6 .
ANOVAs on categorization error rate and response time
confirmed a significant main effect of typicality on perceptions
of agent ambiguity [Ferror (1.15, 33.42) = 86.94, p < 0.01,
ηp2 = 0.75; FRT (2, 58) = 10.89, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.27], in which
ambiguous agents elicited the greatest difficulty (p < 0.01) in
categorization [Merror = 0.32, SD = 0.18; MRT (2, 58) = 1.92s,
SD = 1.08 s] relative to both agents with prototypic appearances
(Merror = 0.01, SD = 0.03; MRT = 1.11 s, SD = 0.40 s)
and those categorized as atypical (Merror = 0.04, SD = 0.06;
MRT = 1.78 s, SD = 1.23 s). Similarly, an ANOVA on atypicality

2.2.2. Pretesting
To confirm that perception of the agents was as expected
(e.g., atypical agents rated as high in atypicality, etc.), we first
pretested these 120 photographs (20 agents per each of the six
intended design conditions) with 30 participants (recruited from
Tufts university and granted course credit in exchange for their
participation). Participants were shown the 120 photographs

6 All analyses were run in R (Version 3.3.1), with statistical significance defined as
α = 0.05. For each ANOVA, the assumption of equal variance was confirmed
using Mauchly’s test of sphericity. In cases of violation, the reported degrees of
freedom and corresponding p-value reflect a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment as
per Girden (1992). For the pairwise contrasts, two-tailed (rather than one-tailed)
t-tests were used to reveal if/when a contrast went in the direction opposite to
that which was predicted and reduce the overall rate of false positive results.
Additionally, all pairwise contrasts reflect a Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons. Lastly, note that while we defined statistical significance at α = 0.05,
all significant results (including both tests of the hypotheses and Bonferronicorrected contrasts) have a p-value of ≤ .01 except where explicitly stated
otherwise.

4 The

current design space of highly humanlike robots is largely comprised of
robots that are gendered/racialized (designed with physical features that convey
gender/race) and skewed toward appearances that are female and Asian
5 The atypicality prompt in Figure 1 is shortened from: “How mismatched are this
agent’s features relative to its overall appearance?” due to space constraints.
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FIGURE 2 | Trial Structure. Each trial began with a 1 s fixation point, followed by a picture viewing of up to 12 s. During the viewing, participants had the option to
terminate the encounter early by pressing the spacebar. In doing so, the image was removed from display, leaving a blank screen for the remainder of the 12 s period.
After the viewing, participants (1) were prompted for their reasons as to why they did or did not press the spacebar, (2) completed a series of checks to confirm
whether the manipulations of agent appearance had the intended effects, and (3) provided an explicit rating of the agent’s eeriness.

removed as soon as participants pressed the spacebar, leaving a
blank screen for the remainder of the viewing period7 . After the
viewing period, participants were prompted for their rationale
as to why they terminated or did not terminate the encounter,
followed by several manipulation checks (see Figure 1) and
prompt for participants’ explicit perceptions of the agent’s
eeriness. At the end of the picture-viewing protocol, participants
were given a brief questionnaire to assess their attitudes toward
robots.

ratings confirmed a main effect of typicality [F(2, 58) = 276.46,
p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.91], in which the set of atypical agents received
significantly higher ratings of atypicality (M = 4.59, SD = 1.00)
relative to prototypic agents (M = 1.78, SD = 0.60; p < 0.01).
In addition, an ANOVA on ratings of human
likeness confirmed a main effect of human similarity
[F(1.58, 45.80) = 512.97, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.95], in which
the highly humanlike (but not prototypically human) agents
received significantly higher ratings (M = 7.02, SD = 0.84)
than prototypic robots (M = 2.66, SD = 1.26; p < 0.01)
and significantly lower ratings than prototypic persons
(M = 8.91, SD = 0.22; p < 0.01).

2.3.3. Measures
To index participants’ aversion, we employed three primary
measures derived from those developed in Strait et al. (2015):

2.3. Experiment

• Eeriness: participants’ subjective ratings of the agents’
appearances. As we used a fully within-subjects design, ratings
were averaged (by participant) across trials within each of the
six agent categories.
• Termination frequency: the frequency at which participants
elected to end their encounters with the various agents
(computed within each of the six agent conditions as the
proportion of trials in which participants pressed the spacebar
to terminate the trial).
• Terminations due to discomfort: the proportion of
terminated trials in which participants reported terminating
due to being unnerved by the shown agent.

2.3.1. Participants
Seventy-five new participants (participants who took part in
pretesting were excluded from participating here) were recruited
from Tufts University and the surrounding community (the
Greater Boston Area), and received either course credit (n = 45)
or monetary compensation (n = 30) at a rate of $10/h for their
participation. Data were unavailable for three participants due
to software crashes (n = 2) and termination of a session due
to failure to follow instructions (n = 1). Thus, a total of 72
participants (26 male) with ages ranging from 18 to 49 years
(M = 19.73, SD = 4.00) were included in our final sample.

2.3.2. Procedure

Finally, to index participants’ attitudes toward robots, we used
the Negative Attitudes Toward Robots Scale (NARS; Nomura
et al., 2006). The scale is comprised of 14 questionnaire items
and produces an overall NARS score (Cronbach’s α = 0.87),
as well as three subscores: negative attitude toward situations
concerning interaction with robots (6 items; α = 0.78), negative
attitude toward the social influence of robots (5 items; α = 0.70),

The final set of 60 photographs were shown using Processing
3.2.1 (©The Processing Foundation) in random order. Each
trial began with a 1 s fixation point followed by the image
presentation, and ended with a 2 s rest period (see Figure 2).
During the viewing period, an image was presented for up to
12 s during which time participants had the option to press a
button (the spacebar) to remove the image from the screen. If
the participant did not press the spacebar, the image was shown
for the full viewing duration (12 s). Otherwise, the image was

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

7 Replacement with a blank screen was done to ensure that the button press could
not be used as a strategy to finish the experiment more quickly.
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TABLE 2 | Main effects of the human similarity manipulation (within-subjects; three levels: low, high10 , and prototypic) and corresponding descriptive statistics (means
and standard deviation for each of the three levels).
ηp2

n

DFn

DFd

F

p

72

1.55

110.26

1188.44

< 0.01

0.94

Eeriness Rating

72

1.73

122.68

250.92

< 0.01

0.78

Termination Frequency

72

2

142

250.92

< 0.01

0.09

Low

High

Prototypic

7.06 (0.81)

8.83 (0.33)

2.50 (1.37)

5.05 (1.13)

1.26 (0.69)

0.30 (0.37)

0.38 (0.35)

0.37 (0.38)
0.03 (0.11)

MANIPULATION CHECKS
Human Similarity Rating

2.99 (1.16)

HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Rationale for Terminating:
Unnerved

39

2

76

39.84

< 0.01

0.51

0.11 (0.29)

0.48 (0.33)

Bored

39

2

76

33.44

< 0.01

0.47

0.74 (0.39)

0.36 (0.33)

0.83 (0.32)

Other

39

2

76

0.18

0.83

0.00

0.14 (0.30)

0.16 (0.27)

0.14 (0.28)
0.32 (0.36)

Rationale for Viewing:
Interested

58

2

114

25.38

< 0.01

0.31

0.52 (0.33)

0.62 (0.29)

Indifferent

58

1.79

102.12

30.01

< 0.01

0.34

0.45 (0.32)

0.32 (0.29)

0.64 (0.36)

Other

58

−

−

−

−

−

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

Note that inferential statistics are unavailable for the “other” response rationale (for viewing), as the variance of the data was zero.

similarity (ηp2 = 0.94). All pairwise contrasts were significant,
with ratings increasing from robots designated as low in human
similarity to highly humanlike agents (Cohen’s dz = 3.50) to
people of prototypic similarity (dz = 2.50).

and negative attitude toward emotions in interacting with robots
(3 items; α = 0.77).

3. RESULTS
3.1. Valley Hypothesis (H1)

3.1.2. Hypothesis Testing

Based on Mori’s uncanny valley theory, we hypothesized that—
relative to robots of low human similarity and persons of
prototypically human appearances—highly humanlike (but not
prototypic) agents can be so discomforting that people would
be averse to interacting with them. To test our hypotheses, a
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on each of the three
dependent variables and relevant manipulation check.6, 8 All
statistics (descriptive and inferential) are reported in Table 2,
with effect sizes9 for significant contrasts reported in the
discussion below.

We expected that, relative to both robots of low human similarity
and persons of prototypically human appearances, participants
would be averse to highly humanlike agents, evidenced by
higher ratings of eeriness (H1a), more frequent termination of
their encounters (H1b), and a greater proportion of terminated
encounters terminated due to being unnerved (H1c). As
expected, there was a main effect of human similarity on all three
indices of aversion—eeriness ratings (ηp2 = 0.78), termination
frequency (ηp2 = 0.09), and the frequency of terminations due to
being unnerved (ηp2 = 0.51) (see Figure 3).
Consistent with the valley theory, participants rated highly
humanlike agents as eerier than both robots of low human
similarity (dz = 1.47) and prototypic persons (dz = 2.93).
In addition, they terminated encounters with highly humanlike
agents more frequently than those with robots of low
human similarity (dz
=
0.45). Lastly, although there
was no significant difference in participants’ termination
frequency between encounters with highly humanlike agents
vs. prototypic persons, significant differences did manifest
in their rationale for terminating. Specifically, participants
reported terminating encounters due to being unnerved more
frequently in response to highly humanlike agents than
they did in response to robots of less human similarity
(dz = 1.03) and prototypic persons (dz
= 1.29). For
comparison, when participants terminated encounters with

3.1.1. Manipulation Check
We assumed that the three similarity designations—robots of
low human similarity, highly humanlike agents, and people
of prototypically human appearances—would be perceived as
having monotonically increasing human similarity (from low to
prototypic). To first confirm this assumption, we conducted an
ANOVA on participants’ ratings of the agents’ human similarity
with human similarity (low, high, prototypic) as the independent
variable. As expected, the results showed a main effect of
8 Only

participants who provided data in all conditions relevant to each particular
test were included (e.g., only participants who terminated at least one encounter
with each of the six agent types were included in analysis of termination
frequencies). Thus, due to listwise deletion of participants with missing data,
the number of observations (and consequently the degrees of freedom) vary
across tests. In addition, while the proportion of encounters terminated due to
being unnerved is the only rationale item central to our hypotheses, all data
for participants’ rationale is included (including rationale for electing to view
photographs in full) for completeness of reporting.
9 Cohen’s d , corrected for the within-subjects design per Morris and DeShon
z
(2002), is reported for all significant contrasts.
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10 In testing the valley hypothesis (H1), the set of agents of high human similarity
(40) includes both robots and people of the atypical and ambiguous designations.
Note also that the set of agents of prototypic human similarity (10) refers only to
the set of people of prototypically human appearances.
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FIGURE 3 | Test of the valley hypothesis (H1). Shown are the three indices of aversion by human similarity level: low, high (inclusive of both atypical and ambiguous
robots and people), and prototypic. The bars show the planned contrasts, with asterisks denoting the significance level (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; or ns:
nonsignificant).

Table 3, with effect sizes9 for significant contrasts reported in the
discussion below.

prototypic persons or with robots of low human similarity,
their rationale for doing so stemmed largely from boredom
(see Table 2).
Taken together, the results show strong support of Mori’s
valley hypothesis. Specifically, relative to robots of low human
similarity and persons of prototypically human appearances,
participants exhibited greater aversion (as evidenced by
their eeriness ratings and avoidance rationale) toward highly
humanlike—but not prototypically human—agents.

3.2.1. Manipulation Checks
Here we made two additional assumptions in our experimental
design. First, we expected that the agents categorized as atypical
would be perceived as more atypical than the other typicality
conditions (prototypic, ambiguous). As expected, an ANOVA on
atypicality ratings showed a main effect of typicality condition
(ηp2 = 0.86). Contrary to our expectations, however, the post
hoc contrasts showed ambiguous agents to prompt the highest
ratings of atypicality, followed by atypical agents (dz = −1.23),
and lastly, prototypic agents (dz
= 2.79). A significant
interaction with ontological category (ηp2 = 0.79) confirmed
our assumption with respect to the robotic agents. Specifically,
atypical robots elicited the highest ratings of atypicality relative to
both prototypic (dz = 2.77) and ambiguous robots (dz = 0.91).
Whereas, amongst human agents, persons of ambiguous category
membership elicited higher ratings than persons with atypical
features (dz = −2.25)11 . Nevertheless, participants rated persons
with atypical features as more atypical than prototypic persons
(dz = 0.97).
Second, we assumed the ambiguous agents (agents proximate
to a nonhuman–human category boundary) would elicit
difficulty in deciding their category membership (robot or
person) on a categorization task. Furthermore, we assumed
categorization difficulty would be reflected by participants’ error
in categorizing and latency to respond (RT). As expected, there
was a main effect of typicality on both categorization error
(ηp2 = 0.61) and RT (ηp2 = 0.36). Specifically, ambiguous agents

3.2. Mechanisms Underlying Uncanniness
(M1–M2)
In identifying an uncanny valley in the current design space of
humanoid robots and range of human appearances, we moved
to testing the mechanisms underlying uncanniness. Here, we
had hypothesized that both atypicality (M1: Feature Atypicality)
and ambiguity (M2: Category Ambiguity) drive people’s aversion
toward highly humanlike (but not prototypically human) agents.
Specifically, to understand when/why/how certain agents fall
into the uncanny valley, we investigated two visual variables
(atypicality, ambiguity) for their impact on people’s perceptions
of highly humanlike agents relative to agents of prototypic
appearances.
In testing these hypotheses and corresponding assumptions,
we ran 2 × 3 within-subjects ANOVAs with the IVs—category
(two levels: robot and person) and typicality (three levels:
prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous)—on each of the three indices
of aversion.6,8 Note that, while we included category as an IV
(due to its inclusion in the experimental design), both of the two
mechanisms require that the valley effect is evident regardless
of the agent’s category membership. Thus, the testing of the
two mechanisms relies on the main effect of typicality, not the
category × typicality (which we explore later). To test the two
mechanisms, we examined two a priori contrasts of interest as
follows: prototypic vs. atypical (M1) and prototypic vs. ambiguous
(M2). All statistics (descriptive and inferential) are reported in

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

11 We speculate that this asymmetry in perception of atypicality stems from two
potential sources. First, participants may have been uncomfortable in making
explicit atypicality ratings of persons with prostheses, and thus the ratings may not
be representative of participants’ actual perception. Second, participants exposure
to persons wearing black, full-sclera contacts is likely lower than that of exposure
to persons with prostheses. Thus, by definition, black eyes are likely perceived as
more atypical of humans than prostheses.
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TABLE 3 | Main effects of the typicality manipulation (within-subjects; three levels: prototypic12 , atypical, ambiguous) and corresponding descriptive statistics (means and
standard deviation for each of the three levels).
p

ηp2

Prototypic

Atypical

Ambiguous

n

DFn

DFd

F

Atypicality Rating

72

1.56

110.70

419.60

< 0.01

0.86

1.80 (.68)

4.25 (1.13)

5.75 (1.52)

Categorization Error (%)

72

1.09

77.64

111.68

< 0.01

0.61

0.00 (.01)

0.02 (0.04)

0.20 (0.15)

RT (s)

72

1.23

87.60

39.74

< 0.01

0.36

0.76 (0.51)

0.93 (0.65)

1.29 (0.98)

MANIPULATION CHECKS

HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Eeriness Rating

72

2

142

216.52

< 0.01

0.75

1.88 (0.85)

5.30 (1.33)

4.81 (1.34)

Termination Frequency

72

1.84

130.89

4.57

0.01

0.06

0.33 (0.36)

0.36 (0.35)

0.40 (0.36)
0.44 (0.37)

Rationale for Terminating:
Unnerved

23

1.51

33.25

21.76

< 0.01

0.50

0.04 (0.12)

0.37 (0.34)

Bored

23

1.02

22.37

21.85

< 0.01

0.50

0.78 (0.33)

0.45 (0.37)

0.38 (0.38)

Other

23

2

44

1.52

0.22

0.06

0.17 (0.29)

0.21 (0.31)

0.17 (0.28)

Interested

52

1.52

77.30

29.61

< 0.01

0.37

0.42 (0.28)

0.67 (0.28)

0.55 (0.32)

Indifferent

52

1.68

85.45

38.37

< 0.01

0.43

0.55 (0.29)

0.28 (0.29)

0.39 (0.32)

Other

52

−

−

−

−

−

0.00 (.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

Rationale for Viewing:

Inferential statistics are unavailable for the “other” response rationale (for viewing), as the variance of the data was again zero.

FIGURE 4 | Test of the underlying mechanisms (M1–M2). Shown are the main effects of typicality (prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous) on the three indices of
aversion. Bars show the planned contrasts, with asterisks denoting significance.

frequency of terminations due to being unnerved (ηp2 = 0.50)
(see Figure 4).
Specifically, the planned contrasts show that participants rated
both atypical and ambiguous agents as significantly eerier than
prototypic agents (datypical = 2.07; dambiguous = 2.02). In
addition, when participants terminated encounters with atypical
and ambiguous agents, they did so more frequently due to
being unnerved (datypical = 1.01; dambiguous = 1.13) than
they did in response to prototypic agents. For comparison,
when participants terminated encounters with prototypic agents,
their rationale for doing so stemmed largely from boredom
(see Table 3).
However, only agents with ambiguous appearances prompted
more frequent avoidance. Specifically, participants terminated
encounters with ambiguous agents more frequently than they did
with prototypic agents (dz = 0.31).

elicited greater categorization error and longer response times
in categorizing relative to both prototypic (derror = 1.29;
dRT = 0.81) and atypical agents (derror = 1.22; dRT = 0.65).

3.2.2. Hypothesis Testing
We had hypothesized that, relative to agents of prototypic
appearances, agents with feature atypicality (M1) and category
ambiguity (M2) would elicit aversion in participants. Consistent
with our predictions, the results show a main effect of
typicality on the three indices of aversion: eeriness ratings
(ηp2 = 0.75), termination frequency (ηp2 = 0.06), and the
12 In

testing the underlying mechanisms (M1–M2), the set of agents of prototypic
typicality (20) includes both mechanomorphic robots and prototypic persons.
Note also that the set of agents of atypical (20) and ambiguous (20) agents is
inclusive of both robots and people.
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FIGURE 5 | Participants’ aversive responding (top: eeriness; middle: termination frequency; bottom: proportion of terminations due to being unnerved) by typicality
(prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous) and within agent category (left grouping: robot; right grouping: person).

3.2.3. Secondary Analyses

In sum, the results here show support for both theoretical
accounts (feature atypicality and category ambiguity).
Specifically, consistent with M1 (feature atypicality), participants
rated atypical agents as eerier than prototypic agents and
avoided them more frequently due to being unnerved.
Similarly, consistent with M2 (category ambiguity), participants
rated ambiguous agents as eerier than prototypic agents,
avoided them more frequently, specifically due to being
unnerved.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

While we found support for both theoretical mechanisms, we also
observed a significant interaction between the agents’ ontological
category and typicality on eeriness ratings (ηp2
= 0.71),
termination frequency (ηp2 = 0.34), and the frequency of terminations due to being unnerved (ηp2 = 0.59), thus indicating
that the effect of typicality manifests differently depending
on whether the agent in question is a robot or a human
(see Figure 5). Hence, we proceeded to explore the
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TABLE 4 | Interaction between the typicality × ontology manipulations, as well as the corresponding descriptive statistics (means and standard deviation) for each of the
three typicality conditions (prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous) by category membership (top: robot; bottom: person).
n

DFn

DFd

F

p

72

1.80

127.53

260.84

< 0.01

ηp2

Prototypic

Atypical

Ambiguous

0.79

2.37 (1.22)

6.30 (1.66)

5.01 (1.72)

1.22 (0.34)

2.20 (1.05)

6.49 (1.80)

0.03 (0.06)

0.26 (0.27)

MANIPULATION CHECKS
Atypicality Rating
Categorization Error (%)

72

1.04

74.11

4.71

0.03

0.06

0.00 (0.01)
0.00 (0.02)

0.01 (0.04)

0.14 (0.27)

RT (s)

72

1.35

95.63

1.42

0.24

0.02

0.76 (0.53)

0.90 (0.63)

1.35 (1.07)

0.77 (0.52)

0.95 (0.72)

1.24 (1.09)

2.50 (1.37)

6.09 (1.36)

3.57 (1.49)

1.26 (.69)

4.50 (1.77)

6.05 (1.77)

0.30 (0.37)

0.46 (0.38)

0.32 (0.37)

0.37 (0.38)

0.27 (0.36)

0.48 (0.41)

0.08 (0.24)

0.52 (0.42)

0.32 (0.33)

0.03 (0.10)

0.09 (0.21)

0.51 (0.40)

0.31 (0.40)

0.44 (0.38)

HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Eeriness Rating
Termination Frequency

72
72

2
1.68

142
119.18

177.61

< 0.01

37.06

< 0.01

0.71
0.34

Rationale for Terminating:
Unnerved

23

2

44

32.04

< 0.01

0.59

Bored

23

2

44

14.39

< 0.01

0.40

0.75 (0.38)
0.81 (0.32)

0.66 (0.39)

0.37 (0.40)

Other

23

2

44

5.41

< 0.01

0.20

0.17 (0.31)

0.18 (0.31)

0.24 (0.31)

0.16 (0.28)

0.25 (0.36)

0.12 (0.28)

0.50 (0.33)

0.61 (0.35)

0.65 (0.32)

0.31 (0.35)

0.69 (0.29)

0.42 (0.41)

0.47 (0.32)

0.30 (0.35)

0.29 (0.31)

0.64 (0.35)

0.28 (0.29)

0.49 (0.40)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

Rationale for Viewing:
Interested

52

2

102

12.05

< 0.01

Indifferent

52

2

102

7.83

< 0.01

Other

52

−

−

−

−

pairwise contrasts between typicality levels and agent
category.
Note that the exploration, however, was limited to within
the respective agent category. This follows from the theoretical
motivations for investigating feature atypicality (M1) and
category ambiguity (M2) for their role in the valley effect,
which rely on contrasts between agents of prototypic appearances
relative to those of atypic and ambiguous appearances. Here, we
also explored the contrast between agents of atypic vs. ambiguous
appearances toward understanding whether one vs. the other
more strongly provokes discomfort.

0.19
0.13

−

at the highest frequencies (dz = 0.59; dz = 0.63), and
did so most frequently due to being unnerved (dz = 1.07;
dz = 0.90). Participants did also exhibit aversion to interacting
with ambiguous robots (though less so than their aversive
responding toward the set of atypical robots). Specifically,
participants rated ambiguous robots as more eerie (dz =
0.63) and terminated their encounters more frequently due to
being unnerved (dz = 0.73) relative to prototypic robots.
Surprisingly, however, participants were not any more avoidant
(evidenced by the frequency at which participants’ terminated
their encounters) of ambiguous robots than they were of
prototypic robots.

3.2.3.1. Responding toward robots
3.2.3.2. Responding toward people

Across all three measures of interest (eeriness ratings,
termination frequency, and terminations due to being unnerved),
the within-category pairwise contrasts suggest that atypicality
drove participants’ aversion toward robots (see Figure 5, top).
Prototypic robots, as expected, were rated as the least eerie
of all robot stimuli. In addition, participants terminated their
encounters less frequently, and when they did so, it was
rarely due to being unnerved (see Table 4). On the other
end, atypical robots—relative to both prototypic and ambiguous
robots—were rated as most eerie (dz = 1.94; dz = 1.48).
Participants also terminated encounters with atypical robots

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Similar to prototypic robots, persons of prototypic appearances
were rated as the least eerie of all persons depicted. Furthermore,
though participants terminated approximately a third of their
encounters with prototypic persons, when they did so, it was
again rarely due to being unnerved (see Table 4). In contrast,
however, to participant responding toward non-prototypic
robots (in which atypicality provoked the greatest aversion),
category ambiguity appeared to drive participants’ aversion
toward the human stimuli (see Figure 5, bottom). Specifically,
participants rated persons of ambiguous category membership
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attitudes about robots. Using the Negative Attitudes toward
Robots Scale, we tested participants’ overall NARS score and
scores on the three NARS subscales – negative attitude toward
situations concerning interactions with robots (S1), negative
attitude toward the social influence of robots (S2), and negative
attitude toward emotions in interacting with robots (S3) – for
any relationship to their subjective and behavioral responding
on the three indices of aversion (eeriness ratings, termination
frequency, terminations due to being unnerved). For each
aversion index, we computed participants’ average response
toward all robotic stimuli and by category (prototypic, atypical,
ambiguous). In total, we computed 48 correlations (three NARS
subscales, plus an overall NARS score; three agent categories,
plus an overall response; three aversion indices) using Pearson’s
r test (see Table 5). However, no significant relationships were
found.

TABLE 5 | Correlation matrix between the NARS scales (overall score and by
subscales: negative attitude toward situations concerning interactions with robots;
negative attitude toward the social influence of robots; and negative attitude
toward emotions in interacting with robots) and participants’ responding toward
robots (overall and by category – prototypic, atypical, and ambiguous) on the
three indices of aversion (eeriness rating, termination frequency, and proportion of
terminations terminated due to being unnerved).
NARS Interactions Social influence Emotions in
with robots

of Robots

interactions

Eeriness Rating

0.14

0.13

0.17

0.04

Prototypic

0.17

0.13

0.16

0.15

Atypical

0.01

−0.05

0.02

0.09

Ambiguous

0.10

0.18

0.15

−0.14

Termination Frequency

0.13

0.12

0.11

0.08

Prototypic

0.16

0.12

0.13

0.16

Atypical

0.08

0.14

0.05

Ambiguous

0.11

0.07

0.13

0.09

Unnerved Rationale

0.09

0.20

0.00

−0.06

−0.02

4. DISCUSSION
Prototypic

0.09

0.21

−0.04

−0.01

Atypical

0.04

0.12

−0.04

−0.03

Ambiguous

0.10

0.25

−0.02

−0.07

In the nearly 50 years since Mori’s formalization of the uncanny
valley (Mori et al., 2012), substantial empirical support has been
found for the hypothesis that agents with highly humanlike
(but not prototypically human) appearances provoke aversive
responding in observers (Kätsyri et al., 2015; Rosenthal-von der
Pütten and Krämer, 2015; MacDorman and Chattopadhyay,
2016). Yet, the mechanisms that lead to such feelings of
discomfort are largely unknown. Moreover, many still question
whether a valley even exists (e.g., Brenton et al., 2005; Hanson
et al., 2005; Bartneck et al., 2009; Burleigh et al., 2013; Zlotowski
et al., 2013; Złotowski et al., 2015).
Those questioning uncanny valley theory are not wrong:
evidence of the valley effect is not in overabundance and the
evidence which does exist varies widely in methodologies used
(Kätsyri et al., 2015), leaving numerous gaps in the literature.
In particular, much of the valley literature is based on (1)
stimuli that represent a small subset of a large design space
(humanoid robots) and (2) measures that do not capture
behavioral implications (relying instead on explicit perception).
Thus, the questions of whether the valley effect is robust (i.e.,
does it generalize to the broader design space) and relevant to
human-robot interaction remain.
Two recent studies, using the largest stimulus sets to date
(45-80 robots), suggest that the valley effect is both robust
and profoundly impactful (Strait et al., 2015; Mathur and
Reichling, 2016). Specifically, using picture-based methodologies
and behavioral measures to supplement the traditional metrics,
the two studies evaluated the impact of a robot’s appearance on
people’s behavior toward a broad range of humanoid robots. In
particular, Mathur and Reichling (2016) found that the valley
reduces people’s trust in highly humanlike robots and we (Strait
et al., 2015) found that, not only do people dislike highly
humanlike robots, but people actively avoid interacting with
them.
As a test of its replicability and extension to this recent work,
we adapted the methodologies of Mathur and Reichling (2016)
and Strait et al. (2015) for another experimental investigation

No significant correlations exist.

as most eerie, relative to both prototypic persons (dz = 2.54)
and persons with atypical features (dz =
− 0.84). They
also terminated their encounters with ambiguous persons at the
highest frequencies (dz = 0.38; dz = −0.70), and did so most
frequently due to being unnerved (dz = 1.21; dz = − 1.22).
In fact, participants terminated their encounters with persons
with atypical features significantly less frequently than their
encounters with prototypic persons (dz = −0.43) and there was
no significant difference between atypical and prototypic persons
in the proportion of encounters that they terminated due to being
unnerved.
Overall, the secondary analyses reveal that the data reflect
greater support for the feature atypicality hypothesis with respect
to robotic agents. With respect to human agents, the results
are suggestive of greater support for the category ambiguity
hypothesis, but uncertainty arising from the study’s manipulation
checks warrants further investigation of this finding13 .

3.3. Negative Attitudes Toward Robots
Lastly, we explored whether participants’ aversive responding
toward our stimuli could be explained by pre-existing negative
13 We

note, however, that the results of the manipulation checks leave us unable
to assert this implication definitively. Specifically, participants rated the set of
“ambiguous” human stimuli as more atypical than those intended to comprise the
“atypical” set (comparable to their robotic counterparts). Though we suggested
that the atypicality ratings of the atypical human stimuli may have been reduced
(due to participants’ discomfort at making explicit ratings), without resolution of
the manipulation check outcome (divergence from what was expected), we are
unable to assume that the asymmetry in responding to human stimuli – that is,
the more aversive responding to stimuli of ambiguous humanness – is driven by
category ambiguity alone.
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aversion (respective eeriness ratings, termination frequency,
and proportion of encounters terminated due to being
unnerved).
Exploration of the typicality × category interaction, however,
suggests that the mechanisms have differential impact on
responding depending on whether the agent in question is
robot or human. Specifically, within the set of robotic stimuli,
atypicality provoked the greatest aversion (highest ratings of
eeriness, more frequent termination of encounters, and greatest
proportion of encounters terminated due to being unnerved). In
fact, while the set of ambiguous robots – relative to prototypic
robots – prompted higher eeriness ratings and more encounters
to be terminated due to being unnerved, they did not elicit greater
avoidance (there was no significant difference in the termination
frequency from that in response to prototypic robots). Moreover,
the ambiguous stimuli were neither the eeriest nor the most
discomforting.
In contrast, within the set of human agents, ambiguity
provoked the greatest aversion in participants (higher ratings of
eeriness, more frequent termination of encounters, and greater
proportion of encounters terminated due to being unnerved).
Surprisingly, while participants rated atypical stimuli as eerier
than persons of prototypically human similarity, participants
terminated their encounters with atypical stimuli less frequently
than with ambiguous and prototypic stimuli.

of the valley’s existence and the design factors that underlie
uncanniness. In particular, we tested two theoretically-motivated
factors—atypicality and category ambiguity—for their effects on
perceptions of uncanniness and resulting avoidant behaviors.
Furthermore, we tested an outstanding and common critique of
the valley—namely, whether people’s aversive responding can be
alternatively explained by pre-existing negative attitudes toward
robots.

4.1. Summary of Findings
4.1.1. Replication of the Valley Effect (H1)
Consistent with our expectations and previous literature (e.g.,
MacDorman, 2006; Kätsyri et al., 2015; Strait et al., 2015; Mathur
and Reichling, 2016), participants exhibited clear aversion
toward agents of high human similarity (highly humanlike
robots and humans with non-prototypic appearances), as
evidenced by higher ratings of eeriness, more frequent avoidance
(early termination of their encounters14 ), and more frequent
termination due to being unnerved.
While there was not a significant difference in termination
frequencies between agents of high similarity and (prototypic)
humans, participants’ endorsed different rationales for
terminating these encounters. Specifically, participants
terminated encounters with human stimuli largely due to
boredom. By contrast, participants terminated over a third of
their encounters with highly humanlike agents due to being
unnerved. In particular, it is worth noting that, while the stimuli
used in the present study were both innocuous and fleeting,
participants nevertheless exhibited significant aversion in their
encounters with the highly humanlike agents. That is, the
appearances of the highly humanlike agents was discomforting
enough that participants often preferred to look at a blank
screen, rather than the agents themselves.
Beyond the confirmation of our first hypothesis, the data
here fully replicate and thus validate the findings of Strait et al.
(2015), demonstrating empirically that the uncanny valley—as
a function of human similarity—provokes robust, emotionallymotivated responses to humanlike robots. Our results also lend
further support to the findings by Mathur and Reichling (2016)
that robots with highly humanlike appearances profoundly (and
negatively) impact people’s behavioral responding.

4.1.3. Negative Attitudes Toward Robots
Exploration of alternative explanations of the above findings
did not yield support for the suggestion that people’s behavior
may be explained by pre-existing and negative attitudes toward
robots (rather than as the result of an uncanny valley
phenomenon). Specifically, no significant relationships were
found in 48 correlational tests between participants’ aversion and
their attitudes toward robots, as indexed by the NARS scales.
These findings suggest that positive exposure and/or additional
experience with robots is unlikely to affect the occurrence of an
uncanny valley effect in humanoid robotics.

4.2. Implications
The present research has three primary theoretical and practical
implications.

4.1.2. Understanding the Uncanny (M1, M2)

4.2.1. Methodological Practices

As hypothesized and consistent with prior indications
(Mitchell et al., 2011; Chattopadhyay and MacDorman,
2016; MacDorman and Chattopadhyay, 2016), atypicality
provoked aversive responding relative to agents with more
typical appearances as evidenced by participants’ ratings
of the agents’ eeriness and the proportion of encounters
terminated early due to being unnerved (M1). Support was
also found for the hypothesized effect of category ambiguity
(M2). Specifically, similar to participants’ responding toward
atypical agents, participants exhibited significant aversion
toward agents of ambiguous category membership relative
to prototypic agents as evidenced by all three indices of

We validated a simple – but effective – laboratory procedure
for assessment of people’s aversion to social robots. In
particular, we adapted a standard procedure from psychology
research for the measurement of social signals (particularly, the
experience and regulation of negative emotion) in laboratorybased human-robot interactions. The protocol contributes both
instrumentation (the measurement of emotion-related social
signals in HRI contexts), as well as an effective work-around for a
longstanding methodological limitation (accessibility of physical
robotic platforms).
Consistency across the multiple measures (of participants’
emotion experience and emotionally-motivated responding) and
between studies (Strait et al., 2015 and here) demonstrates the
reliability of this approach. Whether and how these results

14 Relative

only to robots of low human similarity.
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transfer to more ecologically valid contexts (e.g., actual humanrobot interaction in the wild) remains to be investigated.
However, at a minimum, the protocol provides a means of
making systematic probes of the various visual variables present
in an agent’s appearance.

4.2.2. Uncanny Valley Theory
In providing another experimental test of the uncanny valley
hypothesis, our study reveals a robust uncanny valley in the
design space of social robots in terms of people’s attribution of
eeriness to highly humanlike (but not prototypically human)
agents. More importantly, it validates the previously suggested
(cf. Strait et al., 2015) link between avoidant behavior (early
termination of encounters due to being unnerved) and highly
humanlike robots. Furthermore, this work extends Mori’s initial
postulations to consider specific visual aspects that lead to
uncanniness. Specifically, the findings point to both atypicality
and category ambiguity as driving forces in people’s discomfort.
The two visual variables (atypicality and category ambiguity)
resulted in higher ratings of eeriness, more frequent terminations
of encounters, and a greater proportion of terminations
terminated due to being unnerved.
Of particular note, our exploratory analyses showed that
the atypical robots (which were atypical in the combination
of a highly humanlike head atop a mechanomorphic body)
and ambiguous humans (which were dehumanized via the use
of black, full-sclera contacts, thus occluding the iris) elicited
the greatest aversion. These findings are consistent with prior
literature evaluating mind-related (features related to the head,
and in particular, the eyes) atypicalities (Gray and Wegner, 2012;
Schein and Gray, 2015; Appel et al., 2016). In addition, the
findings support the (relatively common) use of certain visual
effects in media and film to instill a sense of unease in observers.
Consider for example: Pixar’s Babyface (see Figure 6) who was an
unnerving (albeit eventually sympathetic) character in Toy Story
(1995); Joshu Kasei, an ultimately terrifying character in PsychoPass (2012–); and the generally unsettling Ava in Ex Machina
(2015), amongst others.

FIGURE 6 | “Babyface” from Pixar’s Toy Story (1995). Attribution: photograph
(https://goo.gl/GkuBLQ) by Mike Mozart, available under a Creative Commons
Attribution 2.0 Generic license1.

e.g., Riek et al., 2009). However, the increase in interest we’ve
observed pales in magnitude relative to the corresponding
increase in avoidance due to discomfort. Moreover, despite
significantly increased interest and stimuli that were both
innocuous and fleeting, we have consistently observed
participants’ avoidance of encounters with (photographs of)
highly humanlike robots. In considering that such aversion can
be elicited in these settings and in spite of increased interest, we
suggest that designing robots with less human similarity (at least
in their appearance) is a practical and fast solution to the issues
underscored by the present findings.
That being said, our results do not suggest that efforts
to design humanlike robots are futile. Rather, they hint that
attention to certain attributes when designing humanlike robots
may mitigate aversive responding. Specifically, we note that
the set of atypical robots provoked the greatest aversion in
participants, more so than the set of “ambiguous” robots
(androids). This finding is consistent with prior indications that
androids do not necessarily elicit the most negative reactions
(e.g., Rosenthal-von der Pütten and Krämer, 2014), and further,
suggests that the valley effect can be attenuated, if not overcome.
Thus, when designing humanlike robots, our data indicate that
greater consistency amongst features may avoid the elicitation of
aversion. For example, a prototypically mechanical body should
be accompanied by a prototypically mechanical head, even if it
means forgoing more humanlike features. Conversely, a highly
humanlike head should be accompanied by a highly humanlike
body.

4.2.3. Design Considerations
Correspondingly, the findings here provide soft guidelines for the
design of future humanoid systems. Participants’ strong negative
responding—particularly their frequent avoidance of encounters
due to discomfort—establishes a shortcoming of the current
design space. Moreover, the lack of any predictive relationship
between participants’ preexisting attitudes toward robots (as
indexed by NARS) and their aversive responding suggests that
the valley effect is not learned (e.g., via negative portrayals of
robots in media) and furthermore, unlikely to dissipate with
time/exposure. Thus, there is a clear need to consider alternatives
to blanket anthropomorphization.
Broadly, participants’ consistent aversion to highly humanlike
robots demonstrates a significant cost to designing robots with
high human similarity in their appearance. Our results do
show evidence of increased interest in the robots corresponding
to increased human similarity (consistent with the empirical
motivations for increasingly anthropomorphized robot designs;
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4.3. Limitations and Future Directions
The present study contributes a replication and extension of prior
research on the uncanny valley in the domain of social robotics
and human-robot interaction. In particular, it demonstrates
the use of a simple laboratory procedure to evaluate aversive
responding with a large portion of the current design space
of humanoid robots. While we are confident that the present
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influence on children,” “I feel that in the future, society will be
dominated by robots.”). Thus, the scale may align more with
attitudes pertaining to human identity and replacement by robots
(e.g., MacDorman, 2006; Rosenthal-von der Pütten and Krämer,
2015), which may not drive the behavioral valley effects observed
here.

study was well-suited to address our primary goals, the work also
has its limitations that underscore important avenues for future
research.

4.3.1. Demographics
One potentially significant limitation in particular concerns the
demographics of both our participants and of the humanlike
stimuli employed in this study. Specifically, our sampling –
despite attempts to recruit broader participation via public
advertisement within the local metropolitan area – drew a largely
homogenous (predominately white, well-educated, American,
and young) participant population. While these demographics
reflect those of the local university and to some extent, the
geographical region in which the study was conducted, it
nevertheless constrains the interpretation of our results. In
particular, it remains unknown as to whether the observed
valley effects extend to the general population as variations
in participant demographics (e.g., age, culture, etc.) have
been found to affect people’s general perceptions of social
robots (e.g., Bartneck et al., 2005; Kuo et al., 2009; Li et al.,
2010; Lee and Sabanović, 2014; Stafford et al., 2014b; Sundar
et al., 2016). Though these variations have not been studied
directly in relation to the uncanny valley, still there may be
a multitude of sociocultural factors relevant to understanding
the valley phenomenon and its effects on the perception of and
emotionally-motivated responding to robots.
In addition, it is important to note the simultaneous
imbalance in the race/gender of our stimuli. Specifically, the
set of highly humanlike robots is primarily composed of robots
that are female-gendered and phenotypically Asian, while robots
with lesser degrees of human similarity lack explicit race and
gender cues. This imbalance stems from the “demographics”
of the current design space of android robots, in which a
majority of platforms have been modeled after women (who
are predominately Asian) and white men. Though we balanced
our set of human stimuli to reflect the demographics of the
highly humanlike robots, the skewed demographics of both our
stimuli and the participants evaluating it leave the potential for
differential responding on the basis of the agents’ gender/race
(e.g., Fiske et al., 2007; Zebrowitz and Montepare, 2008). This
thus poses a methodological consideration that warrants further
investigation.

4.3.3. Development
Finally, the majority of literature probing the valley and its effects
is limited to young adults. Thus, it remains to be determined
as to when/how the uncanny valley emerges over development.
Specifically, are the indices of aversion that we observed here
present in infants/children in a qualitatively similar way? Or is
the valley limited to adults? While there is evidence of valley
effects in infants (Lewkowicz and Ghazanfar, 2012; Matsuda
et al., 2012), it is methodologically limited. In particular, the
valley effects in infants are evidenced only by their gaze behavior
and only in response to a very small set of agents. Additional
studies evaluating valley effects in children would be useful both
theoretically and practically. Theoretically, observation of a valley
before young adulthood would lend support to the notion that
the valley stems from more intrinsic perceptual mechanisms
(e.g., the category uncertainty hypothesis and categorization
theory). Practically, regardless of its innateness, understanding
how younger populations perceive social robots would determine
whether their design needs to be modified as a function of age of
the population for which the robot is designed.

5. CONCLUSIONS
Our results both replicated and extended prior research,
providing further empirical support for Mori’s uncanny valley
hypothesis and its relevance to human-robot interaction.
Specifically, we demonstrated a robust valley effect within the
current design space of humanoid robotics, wherein people
showed significant behavioral aversion to highly humanlike
robots. Moreover, we found no relationship between people’s
aversion and any pre-existing attitudes toward robots, suggesting
that time and/or exposure to robots is unlikely to mitigate
the valley effect. These findings underscore both a need for
careful attention to the appearance of humanoid robots and the
importance of measuring people’s emotional responses to robots
during the design phase.
At present, the findings serve to provide general guidance in
the design of future social robots. In particular, our exploration
points to two visual factors that should be considered, namely
atypicality and category ambiguity. Our results suggest, for
example, that it would be wise to design new robots with
greater consistency between features and greater distance from
the robot-human boundary (in either direction). Doing so may
help to mitigate aversive reactions and, thus, maximize the utility
of robots in contexts requiring interaction with humans.

4.3.2. Instrumentation
In addition to the above considerations, we also note a potential
limitation with respect to the measurement of negative attitudes
toward robots. Specifically, we employed the NARS scales
(Nomura et al., 2006) for indexing participants’ attitudes in
order to address a longstanding critique of valley theory, namely
whether people’s aversion stems from pre-existing negative
attitudes. Though no significant relationship was observed
between the NARS and aversion indices, it is possible that
the NARS scales do not capture negative attitudes that are
relevant to the uncanny valley. Specifically, the content of the
NARS questionnaire items range from context-related (e.g., “I
would feel nervous just standing in front of a robot”) to highly
philosophical in nature (e.g., “I would feel uneasy if robots really
had emotions,” “I am concerned that robots would be a bad
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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Lee, H. R., and Sabanović, S. (2014). “Culturally variable preferences for robot
design and use in south korea, turkey, and the united states,” in Proceedings
of the 2014 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-robot Interaction
(Bielefeld: ACM), 17–24.
Lewkowicz, D. J., and Ghazanfar, A. A. (2012). The development of the uncanny
valley in infants. Dev. Psychobiol. 54, 124–132. doi: 10.1002/dev.20583
Li, D., Rau, P. P., and Li, Y. (2010). A cross-cultural study: effect
of robot appearance and task. Int. J. Soc. Robot. 2, 175–186.
doi: 10.1007/s12369-010-0056-9
MacDorman, K. F. (2006). “Subjective ratings of robot video clips for human
likeness, familiarity, and eeriness: An exploration of the uncanny valley,” in
ICCS/CogSci-2006 Long Symposium: Toward Social Mechanisms of Android
Science, 26–29.
MacDorman, K. F., and Chattopadhyay, D. (2016). Reducing consistency in
human realism increases the uncanny valley effect; increasing category
uncertainty does not. Cognition 146, 190–205. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.
09.019
Mathur, M. B., and Reichling, D. B. (2016). Navigating a social world with robot
partners: a quantitative cartography of the uncanny valley. Cognition 146,
22–32. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.008
Matsuda, Y.-T., Okamoto, Y., Ida, M., Okanoya, K., and Myowa-Yamakoshi, M.
(2012). Infants prefer the faces of strangers or mothers to morphed faces: an
uncanny valley between social novelty and familiarity. Biol. Lett. 8, 725–728.
doi: 10.1098/rsbl.2012.0346
Mitchell, W. J., Szerszen, K. A., Lu, A. S., Schermerhorn, P. W., Scheutz, M., and
MacDorman, K. F. (2011). A mismatch in the human realism of face and voice
produces an uncanny valley. i-Perception 2, 10–12. doi: 10.1068/i0415
Mori, M., MacDorman, K. F., and Kageki, N. (1970/2012). The uncanny
valley [from the field]. IEEE Robot. Automat. Magazine 19, 98–100.
doi: 10.1109/MRA.2012.2192811
Morris, S. B., and DeShon, R. P. (2002). Combining effect size estimates in metaanalysis with repeated measures and independent-groups designs. Psychol.
Methods 7:105. doi: 10.1037/1082-989X.7.1.105
Nomura, T., Kanda, T., and Suzuki, T. (2006). Experimental investigation into
influence of negative attitudes toward robots on human–robot interaction. AI
Soc. 20, 138–150. doi: 10.1007/s00146-005-0012-7
Piwek, L., McKay, L. S., and Pollick, F. E. (2014). Empirical evaluation of the
uncanny valley hypothesis fails to confirm the predicted effect of motion.
Cognition 130, 271–277. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.001
Riek, L. D., Rabinowitch, T.-C., Chakrabarti, B., and Robinson, P. (2009).
“Empathizing with robots: Fellow feeling along the anthropomorphic
spectrum,” in 2009 3rd International Conference on Affective Computing and
Intelligent Interaction and Workshops (Amsterdam: IEEE), 1–6.

Andrist, S., Mutlu, B., and Tapus, A. (2015). “Look like me: matching robot
personality via gaze to increase motivation,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual
ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Seoul: ACM),
3603–3612.
Appel, M., Weber, S., Krause, S., and Mara, M. (2016). “On the eeriness of service
robots with emotional capabilities,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Christchurch),
411–412.
Bartneck, C., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., and Hagita, N. (2009). “My robotic
doppelgänger-a critical look at the uncanny valley,” in Proceedings of the 18th
IEEE Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN)
(Toyama), 269–276.
Bartneck, C., Nomura, T., Kanda, T., Suzuki, T., and Kato, K. (2005). “Cultural
differences in attitudes towards robots,” in Proceedings of Symposium on Robot
Companions (SSAISB 2005 Convention) (Hatfield), 1–4.
Brenton, H., Gillies, M., Ballin, D., and Chatting, D. (2005). The Uncanny Valley:
does it exist and is it related to presence. Presence Connect.
Broadbent, E., Kumar, V., Li, X., Sollers, J. III. Stafford, R. Q., MacDonald, B. A.,
et al. (2013). Robots with display screens: a robot with a more humanlike face
display is perceived to have more mind and a better personality. PLoS ONE
8:e72589. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0072589
Burleigh, T. J., Schoenherr, J. R., and Lacroix, G. L. (2013). Does the uncanny
valley exist? an empirical test of the relationship between eeriness and the
human likeness of digitally created faces. Comput. Hum. Behav. 29, 759–771.
doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2012.11.021
Chattopadhyay, D., and MacDorman, K. F. (2016). Familiar faces rendered strange:
why inconsistent realism drives characters into the uncanny valley. J. Vis. 16,
7–7. doi: 10.1167/16.11.7
Duffy, B. R. (2003). Anthropomorphism and the social robot. Robot. Auton. Sys.
42, 177–190. doi: 10.1016/S0921-8890(02)00374-3
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., and Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of
social cognition: Warmth and competence. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 77–83.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005
Girden, E. R. (1992). ANOVA: Repeated Measures. Number 84.
Gray, K., and Wegner, D. M. (2012). Feeling robots and human zombies:
mind perception and the uncanny valley. Cognition 125, 125–130.
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.007
Groom, V., Nass, C., Chen, T., Nielsen, A., Scarborough, J. K., and Robles,
E. (2009). Evaluating the effects of behavioral realism in embodied
agents. Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud. 67, 842–849. doi: 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2009.
07.001
Hanson, D., Olney, A., Prilliman, S., Mathews, E., Zielke, M., Hammons, D.,
et al. (2005). “Upending the uncanny valley,” in Proceedings of the National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 20 (Menlo Park, CA; Cambridge, MA;
London; AAAI Press; MIT Press), 1728.
Inkpen, K. M., and Sedlins, M. (2011). “Me and my avatar: exploring users’
comfort with avatars for workplace communication,” in Proceedings of the
ACM International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work
(Hangzhou: ACM), 383–386.
Jentsch, E. (1997). On the psychology of the uncanny. J. Theor. Human. 2, 7–16.
Kätsyri, J., Förger, K., Mäkäräinen, M., and Takala, T. (2015). A review of
empirical evidence on different uncanny valley hypotheses: support for
perceptual mismatch as one road to the valley of eeriness. Front. Psychol. 6:390.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00390

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

input

16

August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1366

Strait et al.

Understanding the Uncanny

Sundar, S. S., Waddell, T. F., and Jung, E. H. (2016). “The hollywood robot
syndrome: media effects on older adults’ attitudes toward robots and adoption
intentions,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM/IEEE Conference on Human-Robot
Interaction (HRI) (Christchurch), 343–350.
Vujovic, L., Opitz, P. C., Birk, J. L., and Urry, H. L. (2013). Cut! that’s a wrap:
regulating negative emotion by ending emotion-eliciting situations. Front.
Psychol. 5:165. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00165
Yamada, Y., Kawabe, T., and Ihaya, K. (2013). Categorization difficulty
is associated with negative evaluation in the “uncanny valley”
phenomenon. Jpn. Psychol. Res. 55, 20–32. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5884.2012.
00538.x
Yamamoto, K., Tanaka, S., Kobayashi, H., Kozima, H., and Hashiya, K. (2009).
A non-humanoid robot in the “uncanny valley”: experimental analysis of the
reaction to behavioral contingency in 2–3 year old children. PLoS ONE 4:e6974.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0006974
Zebrowitz, L. A., and Montepare, J. M. (2008). Social psychological face
perception: why appearance matters. Soc. Person. Psychol. Compass 2, 1497–
1517. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00109.x
Zlotowski, J., Proudfoot, D., and Bartneck, C. (2013). “More human than
human: does the uncanny curve really matter?,” in Proceedings of the
8th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction,
Workshop on Design of Humanlikeness in HRI from Uncanny Valley
to Minimal Design, ed H. Kuzuoka (Piscataway, NJ: IEEE Press),
7–13.
Złotowski, J., Proudfoot, D., Yogeeswaran, K., and Bartneck, C. (2015).
Anthropomorphism: opportunities and challenges in human–robot
interaction. Int. J. Soc. Robot. 7, 347–360. doi: 10.1007/s12369-014-0267-6

Rosenthal-von der Pütten, A. M., and Krämer, N. C. (2014). How design
characteristics of robots determine evaluation and uncanny valley related
responses. Comput. Hum. Behav. 36, 422–439. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2014.03.066
Rosenthal-von der Pütten, A. M., and Krämer, N. C. (2015). Individuals’
evaluations of and attitudes towards potentially uncanny robots. Int. J. Soc.
Robot. 7, 799–824. doi: 10.1007/s12369-015-0321-z
Rosenthal-von der Pütten, A. M., Krämer, N. C., Becker-Asano, C., Ogawa, K.,
Nishio, S., and Ishiguro, H. (2014). The uncanny in the wild. analysis of
unscripted human–android interaction in the field. Int. J. Soc. Robot. 6, 67–83.
doi: 10.1007/s12369-013-0198-7
Sauppé, A., and Mutlu, B. (2015). “The social impact of a robot co-worker in
industrial settings,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (ACM), 3613–3622.
Saygin, A. P., Chaminade, T., Ishiguro, H., Driver, J., and Frith, C. (2012). The
thing that should not be: predictive coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving
human and humanoid robot actions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7, 413–422.
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr025
Schein, C., and Gray, K. (2015). The eyes are the window to the uncanny
valley: mind perception, autism and missing souls. Inter. Stud. 16, 173–179.
doi: 10.1075/is.16.2.02sch
Stafford, R. Q., MacDonald, B. A., Jayawardena, C., Wegner, D. M., and Broadbent,
E. (2014a). Does the robot have a mind? mind perception and attitudes
towards robots predict use of an eldercare robot. Int. J. Soc. Robot. 6, 17–32.
doi: 10.1007/s12369-013-0186-y
Stafford, R. Q., MacDonald, B. A., Li, X., and Broadbent, E. (2014b). Older people’s
prior robot attitudes influence evaluations of a conversational robot. Inter. J.
Soc. Robot. 6, 281–297. doi: 10.1007/s12369-013-0224-9
Steckenfinger, S. A., and Ghazanfar, A. A. (2009). Monkey visual behavior falls
into the uncanny valley. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 18362–18366.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.0910063106
Strait, M., Canning, C., and Scheutz, M. (2014). “Let me tell you! investigating
the effects of robot communication strategies in advice-giving situations based
on robot appearance, interaction modality and distance,” in Proceedings of
the 9th ACM/IEEE Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (Bielefeld),
479–486.
Strait, M., Vujovic, L., Floerke, V., Scheutz, M., and Urry, H. (2015). “Too much
humanness for human-robot interaction: exposure to highly humanlike robots
elicits aversive responding in observers,” in Proceedings of the 33rd ACM
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI) (Seoul), 3593–3602.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Strait, Floerke, Ju, Maddox, Remedios, Jung and Urry. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.

17

August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1366

